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This paper is the story of success and failure in the financial markets, the markets 
for goods and services and in politics.  It is a difficult story to tell because the 
crisis had many causes, but the focus here is on three main factors. First, the 
incentives  that  contributed  to  a  credit-fuelled  bubble,  especially  in  property 
markets. Monetary and regulatory policies feature prominently in this part of the 
story. Second, because the housing bubble alone cannot explain the magnitude of 
the  subsequent  events,  gearing  in  the  financial  sector,  which  affected  asset 
markets  unrelated  to  sub-prime  mortgages  will  be  examined.  These 
developments  are  explained  by  reference  to  private  financial  sector  decisions, 
including the role of the shadow-banking sector, and their regulatory backdrop. 
Finally, an answer will be sought to the question of how highly geared banks first 
became fragile and then failed with such dire consequences for the economy that 
massive  policy  intervention  had  become  essential.  The  consequences  of  these 
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   3 
Introduction 
 
The  logic  of  the  industrial  revolution  is  specialisation  with  cooperation.  Increased  specialisation 
raises productivity but requires a high degree of cooperation from the level of local firms and local 
economy to national and international levels.  Adam Smith, the eighteen century moral philosopher 
and pioneer of political economy, realised at the outset that specialisation is held back by the scale 
and cost of cooperation, or in his words, by the “extent of the market” (Smith, 1776[1981], Book 1, 
chapter  3).  As  the  industrial  revolution  gathered  momentum  over  the  following  centuries, 
entrepreneurs discovered new ways to specialise in an environment in which international trade was 
pushing the market outwards while financiers were creating ever more efficient ways for savers and 
investors to cooperate profitably internationally.  
 
Never before had this cooperation reached the heights of the first decade of this century or the 
accompanying fastest rise in prosperity ever known to humankind. But this would not last. During 
2008 the financial side of this process collapsed with alarming speed as markets failed on a grand 
scale. The force of the collapse was such that not only the financial markets but also international 
trade and the production of industrial goods and services suffered severe contractions leading to 
what is now known as Great Recession. Policy makers found themselves under immense pressure to 
act decisively. Despite some blunders many successful policies have been implemented but even 
those contributed to a renewed pressure on international economic and political cooperation. By 
October 2010 this tension erupted in what has been called the “currency wars”.  
 
This paper is the story of success and failure in the financial markets, the markets for goods and 
services and in politics.  It is a difficult story to tell because the crisis had many causes.  The US  
Bipartisan  Commission  created  in  2009  to  study  the  crisis  identified  22  causes  while  the  US 
Congressional Research Service found four more (Roberts, 2010). But probably the most concise 
summary of events was offered by the CEO of the ill-fated Bear Sterns who said: “We all [messed] 
up”. He meant government, rating agencies, Wall Street, commercial banks, regulators, in short, 
everybody (Roberts, 2010: 5). 
 
To pass the jungle of causes in one short paper allows only pointing out the most important markers 
on the road to crisis. This possibly controversial selection will focus on three main factors. First, the 
incentives that contributed to a credit-fuelled bubble, especially in property markets. Second, because 
the housing bubble alone cannot explain the subsequent events, the gearing in the financial sector,   4 
which affected asset markets unrelated to sub-prime mortgages will be examined. Finally, an answer 
will be sought to the question of how highly geared banks first became fragile and then failed with 
such dire consequences for the economy that massive policy intervention had become essential.  
 
When incentives go astray 
 
The sub-prime market 
 
The story of the international financial crisis of 2008/09 starts with credit. The two principal actors 
involved in credit transactions are the lenders who provide finance on profitable terms but subject to 
various risks, and the borrowers who acquire finance at the cost of interest. To understand how the 
credit-fuelled  housing  bubble  emerged,  giving  rise  to  the  crisis,  it  is  necessary  to  mention  the 
incentives and opportunities available both to the financial institutions that provide credit and to the 
borrowers who obtain mortgages.   
 
Since  the  Great  Depression  mortgages  on  residential  property  in  the  United  States  have  been 
supported  by  a set  of state  owned institutions known as Fannie Mae  and Freddie Mac
1. These 
institutions do not originate mortgages but buy them from financial institutions who deal directly 
with potential home owners, such as local savings & loans corporations and loca l banks. The 
mortgages Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acquire in this way are then packaged and sold as portfolios 
of property investment.
2   This has been a useful service in a country where, for historical reasons, 
there is no single bank with a national branch network and the geographically uneven growth places 
severe limits on the ability of financial institutions to allocate savings efficiently to investments.  
 
Generally speaking there are two types of mortgages. The one is the more traditional originate -and-
hold model; the other one is the originate -and-distribute model. In the originate-and-hold model a 
bank that grants the mortgage retains it as an asset on its balance sheet and is thus strongly motivated 
to control the credit quality of the mortgages.  Paying close attention to the size of the mortgage, the 
income and credit record of the applicant and the value of the property is the traditional way to 
control the credit risk associated with the originate-and-hold model. 
 
                                                 
1 Fannie Mae is short for the „Federal National Mortgage Association‟ and Freddie Mac is short for the „Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation‟.  
2 Such a portfolio is called a Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) and is an example of a broader class of Asset Backed 
Securities (ABS).   5 
In  the  originate-and-distribute  model  the  incentives  are  different  because  the  object  here  is  to 
persuade others that the assets are of suitably high quality. As is often the case in the financial sector, 
the prospective home owner and the financial institution have different information, a discrepancy 
that  makes  co-operation  between  lenders  and  borrowers  difficult.  Mortgage  originators  have  to 
overcome an additional information difference to convince potential investors of the credit quality of 
the  mortgages  they  are  selling,  a  problem  alleviated  somewhat  since  the  1970s  when  mortgage 
institutions started to use credit rating agencies to close the information gap (White, 2010).  
 
In the USA, the government-backed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offered a special version of the 
credit rating solution. They were willing to buy mortgages from mortgage originators and would then 
resell portfolios to other investors with the assurance that these investors would face no credit risk: 
both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would buy back any mortgages should these default in the future. 
This process of securitisation, that is, creating mortgage backed securities (MBS), transformed risky 
mortgages  into  risk-free  portfolios  and  played  the  double  role  of  providing  a  subsidy  to  home 
ownership in the USA as well as serving an important political goal
3 (Roberts, 2010).  But it left 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exposed to credit risk, a risk they controlled by using a set of strict 
guidelines for the mortgages they would be willing to securitise. Mortgages that satisf ied these 
guidelines were known as Standard Conforming Loans.  
 
Needless  to  say,  insisting  on  „standard  conforming  loans‟  restricted  the  class  of  potential  home 
owners, a restriction politically unpopular because of its social cost.  To sidestep this problem a series 
of reforms were instituted making possible a class of „sub-prime‟ mortgages that did not adhere to 
these strict criteria either by size, credit record, income or wealth of the applicant. The first step was 
to allow market related and adjustable interest rates on mortgages.
4 With greater flexibility to reflect 
the increased credit risk of customers whose credit scores were below the standard requirements, 
mortgage originators were now able to deal in what became known as the sub-prime market.       
 
The second step was the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that pushed sub -prime to the fore by disallowing 
tax deductions for consumer credit but retaining it for mortgage debt on a primary and one 
additional home. Mortgage finance in general, including the sub -prime component, expanded 
                                                 
3 Private sector banks can also buy mortgages from originators to form MBS for later resale to investors and did so on a 
large scale.  
4 This was achieved by the combined effect of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA) in 1980 and Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA) two years later.   6 
substantially in  the  wake of this decision  (Chomsisengphet  and Pennington-Cross,  2006). Other 
factors,  such  as  the  long  economic  upswing  of  the  nineties  and  the  stable  macroeconomic 
environment since the mid-eighties as well as political and social pressures, contributed to a dramatic 
expansion of mortgage lending in the USA over the last twenty years. In 1995 sub-prime mortgage 
originations  amounted  to  $65  billion  in  a  market  of  $639.4  billion  mortgages.  By  2003,  these 
numbers grew to $332 billion and $3.76 trillion respectively (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 
2006, table 3). Easy credit financed a dramatic expansion in residential property, driving up prices on 
existing homes and fuelling new developments. During the height of the 2004 property boom in Las 
Vegas, for example, a new house went up every twenty minutes on average (Kunzig, 2011). Too 
much of this was financed with sub-prime mortgages, the cumulative total of which exceeded a 
trillion dollars by 2007, the year in which the sub-prime boom turned to bust (Lockhart, 2008).  
 
The rapid growth in the sub-prime market could only occur once the high costs associated with 
lending to this market had been overcome. Sub-prime mortgages are more expensive for both the 
lender and the mortgage originator since the information asymmetry is more serious in this market 
segment  and  the  likelihood  of  default  is  much  higher.  These  elevated  costs  are  seen  in  higher 
application and appraisal fees, higher interest rates, higher default insurance and higher interest rates. 
Despite  the  inherent high costs three factors combined to make  sub-prime  mortgages relatively 
attractive over this period: monetary policy, financial regulation and politics. 
 
Monetary policy and the ‘great divergence’ 
 
What role, if any, did monetary policy play in creating the environment for the crisis and allowing it 
to unfold?  Starting with the  housing  market there seemed  to have been  acts of omission  and 
commission  especially  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  (Fed)  and  other  central  banks  that  either 
encouraged the housing boom or allowed it to run unchecked. Starting with acts of omission,  there 
is little evidence that monetary authorities used policy instruments directly to contain the boom in 
residential property. In this the policymakers had implemented the modern consensus of responding 
to asset prices only to the extent that they affect general inflation or risk overheating the economy, 
leaving scope for strong policy action (or mopping-up) should an asset boom turn to bust (Bernanke 
and  Gertler,  1999).  But  the  severity  of  the  episode  has  encouraged  revision  of  this  „mop-up-
afterwards‟ approach to asset bubbles and a finer distinction is now being drawn between types of 
asset price bubbles. The old consensus is still applicable for bubbles on the stock market, where bank   7 
credit played a small part, but not for „credit bubbles‟ where the provision of cheap credit by banks 
plays a central role (Mishkin, 2008).   
 
Central banks are financial regulators and are therefore far better informed about lending by banks, 
and potentially also about the prudence of that lending, than about fundamental support for stock 
market prices. And central banks have a range of regulatory powers that can be used to reign in 
credit lending that is fuelling an asset bubble. In other words, they have instruments at their disposal 
that can influence the behaviour of banks. But to act against credit bubbles requires an ex ante 
reading and there is not much evidence that either the Fed, or other major Central Banks, were able 
to do that with respect to the recent crisis. In fact, the former Fed Deputy Governor Alan Blinder, 
when assessing the risks to various dimensions of US monetary policy in August 2005 while the 
credit bubble was well under way, stated there were moderate risks to inflation, employment and 
aggregate demand and only a high risk of a supply side shock. Crucially, he identified the level of risk 
for both the banking sector and credit risk to be low, stable and covered by strong risk management 
(Blinder, 2005: Table 1).  
 
The  Fed  did  not  use  policy  measures  to  prevent  either  the  housing  boom  or  the  associated 
development in the derivative markets from accelerating despite the Bernanke-Gertler consensus 
that requires monetary authorities to care about asset prices to the extent they affect the outlook for 
price stability and the business cycle.  In fact, between 2002 and 2006 the policy interest rate in the 
United State deviated further from the benchmark „Taylor rule‟ than at any point since the 1970s. 
The „Taylor rule‟ is fundamentally a normative instrument used to calculate the appropriate level of 
the policy interest rate. It also describes the actual Federal Reserve Board policy since 1980 with a 
high degree of accuracy, and in a modified version it is comparably accurate for other developed 
countries  (Clarida,  Gali  and  Gertler,  1997).  At  the  same  time,  deviations  from  the  rule  can  be 
interpreted as a measure of the discretion exercised by the Fed. In this sense the path US monetary 
policy took between 2002 and 2006 can be interpreted as a substantial discretionary departure from 
normal practice; Taylor has called it the “Great Deviation” and his argument is that the Federal 
Reserve board fuelled the housing boom, and the associated financial market gearing, by keeping 
interest rates too low for too long.  
 
There is empirical evidence (Leamer, 2007; Taylor, 2007; Ahrend, Cournède, and Price, 2008) to 
support the thesis that monetary policy decisions, whether reasonable or not, contributed to the   8 
credit financed housing bubble in the US and elsewhere. But low interest rates had an additional 
unfortunate effect on the credit bubble that ultimately led to the collapse of key banks and financial 
institutions and the near collapse of many more internationally. In addition to encouraging lending, 
low interest rates also tend to change the incentives for banks as they tempt them into relatively 
more risky behavior in the form of higher gearing on their balance sheets, which means expanding a 
bank‟s balance sheets without a corresponding expansion of its capital base.  
 
Theoretically there are two ways in which low interest rates could promote higher gearing at banks 
(Borio  and  Zhu,  2008;  Adrian  and  Shin,  2009).  First,  the  low  nominal  returns  on  cash  might 
encourage financial firms to pursue higher yielding but more risky investments, especially if they are 
contracted to deliver a given nominal return. Second, the effect of low interest rates on asset prices 
and cash flows might allow financial firms to carry more unsafe investments while their balance 
sheets will appear sound. Leonardo Gambacorta (2009) recently added empirical plausibility to these 
theoretical results by investigating the hypotheses for the current crisis with a database of 600 listed 
banks in the USA and Europe.  
 
Financial regulation and moral hazard 
 
The centrality of prices in market co-operation means that low interest rates typically play a large role 
in explaining asset bubbles, but low interest rates are not the only factor. Institutions, or „rules of the 
game‟, as they are also called in economics (for example, North 1990) make it harder or easier to 
specialise and co-operate. These institutions affect a vast range of decisions and played a critical role 
in the financial decisions that led to the international financial crisis. This refers in particular to the 
rules of financial regulation.  
 
Traditionally there are three justifications for formal financial sector regulation (Goodhart, 2010). 
The first is to prevent the abuse of potential monopoly power by very large institutions; the second is 
to  protect  consumers  from  the  asymmetric  distribution  of  information  in  many  financial 
transactions. But neither of these two roles had much impact in the run-up to the financial crisis. 
Instead, it was the third role, the containment of spillover effects from one institution to others that 
played a key role. These spillovers (or externalities) are caused by the interconnected nature of the 
modern financial system where the value of the assets of one firm is closely linked to the assets of 
other financial firms. Stress on a large firm that results in downward pressure on asset prices can   9 
quickly spill over to other firms in this kind of network. Economists call this an externality because 
individual banks do not typically factor in the risk they pose to the rest of the financial system in 
which they operate.   
 
The one way to contain potential spillovers is via changes to formal institutions; the others ways 
include financial innovation and amendments to regulatory practice. While some important changes 
to financial regulation had indeed been introduced during the last forty years, these often followed in 
the wake of financial innovation and regulatory practice. Perhaps the most famous single decision 
that had a bearing on the crisis was the enactment of the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act in the USA at the 
end of the 1990s, which formally removed the separation between commercial banks funded by 
insured deposits, and investment banks funded on the capital markets. The separation had been 
upheld since the 1930s by the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts. Following the Act 
larger  financial  groups  emerged  providing  a  wider  array  of  financial  services  in  an  increasingly 
complex corporate structure.  
 
The boundaries between commercial and investment banks had long since become blurred because 
financial innovations, such as money market mutual funds, allowed investment banks to compete 
with  the  formerly  most  profitable  part  of  commercial  banking  (Kling,  2010)  i.e.  funding  their 
investment activities by taking deposits on which they paid low interest rates. This, in turn, forced 
commercial banks to change their own behaviour. They became less dependent on deposits and 
started  funding  their  investments  on  the  capital  markets,  especially  on  the  inter-bank  and  repo 
markets; since the 1970s to expand their balance sheets, commercial banks supplemented their intake 
of deposits by using wholesale money markets such as the eurodollar market (Goodhart, 2010). With 
commercial banks adopting the balance sheet operations of investment banks while the latter offered 
products that competed directly with commercial banks, the line between these two sectors had 
become blurred giving rise to a „shadow banking system‟.  
 
The „shadow banking system‟ is a term now used to describe a part of the non-commercial bank 
financial sector that competes with commercial banks to offer financial services, such as credit, to 
business enterprises. In the USA the shadow banking system became so large that by 2007 its lending 
exceeded that of the traditional banking system (Geithner, 2008). Although the shadow banking 
system operates outside the conventional system of bank regulation it is deeply interconnected with   10 
the  traditional  banking  system.  Indeed,  it  is  through  the  shadow  banking  system  that  the 
conventional banking system is now largely funded (Gorton, 2010; Goodhart, 2010).   
 
Loans extended by banks to their customers are typically long-term and are profitable assets for 
banks. But to conduct this business banks need to finance the assets. Traditionally commercial banks 
obtained their funding by accepting retail deposits, which are potentially short-term liabilities for 
banks. The mismatch between the highly liquid but potentially short-term character of the liabilities 
and the longer-term but less liquid character of the assets exposed traditional banks to the risk of a 
bank-run. This occurs when a large proportion of a bank‟s depositors turn up to demand their 
deposits,  which  even  a  fundamentally  solvent  bank  would  be  unable  to  satisfy  because  of  the 
illiquidity of its assets. 
 
Modern  banks  by  contrast  extend  credit  and  fund  lending  by  combining  loans  in  securitised 
portfolios (ABS) in which the portfolios of assets have been re-arranged using structured finance.
5 
This is a set of techniques used to combine and arrange portfolios of assets in such a way as to create 
portfolios of asset backed securities that have different risk profiles from the original assets . Not all 
ABS were sold though: during the crisis it emerged that banks held substantial portfolios of ABS, 
which harmed their balance sheets once the underlying asset prices declined. There were two reasons 
for holding the risky ABS on a bank‟s balance sheet. First, to satisfy the demand for another product 
that has become very important in the modern banking system, i.e. the wish to make risk free highly-
liquid deposits by institutional investors and other non-financial firms in the repo market (Gorton, 
2010). Second, the Basel II accord incentivised banks to use the highly rated senior tranches of ABS 
to fulfil their capital adequacy requirements.   
 
The shadow banking system emerged when the traditional funding mechanism of banks via deposits 
became unprofitable. Since then securitisation of assets came to play a central role in the modern 
funding of banks while securitised asset portfolios became critical collateral in the repo market. In 
this way the balance sheets of banks, non-bank financial firms and other large non-financial firms 
                                                 
5 An example of structured finance that played an important role during the crisis are so-called Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs), which are portfolios constructed by arranging the underlying portfolio into different „tranches‟, 
each with a different priority claim on the income stream of the underlying assets. In this way the senior tranche of a 
CDO is much less risky than the underlying assets, though the risk attached to the senior tranche is greatly affected by 
the degree to which the risks of the underlying assets are correlated.  The more risky junior tranches of different CDOs 
can in turn be combined in a new portfolio which can be re-arranged to yield new senior tranches with apparently low 
risk.  When CDOs are combined in this way to create a second generation of CDOs (CDO2), their value is even more 
sensitive to the underlying assumptions than a CDO. Coval, Jurek, Stafford, (2009) provides an accessible introduction to 
the role of structured finance in the financial crisis.    11 
became  closely  intertwined.  Large  insurance  companies  also  formed  part  of  the  same  system; 
American  International  Group  (AIG)  in  the  USA,  for  example,  offered  insurance  called  Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) on the securitised portfolios that allowed the portfolios to obtain attractive 
credit ratings.  
 
The  modern  banking  system  has  become  very  depended  on  extensive  cooperation  on  globally 
interlinked financial markets. Banks need to finance their balance sheets on a daily basis (Blanchard, 
2009), and a healthy capital ratio is the traditional method used by banks to show that they are credit-
worthy counterparties in such agreements.  
 
The Basel I and II accords on prudential bank regulation aimed to help banks ensure adequate capital 
ratios,  though  they  did  so  in  a  fundamentally  flawed  manner.  For  example,  the  Basel  I  accord 
differentiated  between  assets  on  a  risk-adjusted  basis  but  the  design  was  faulty  and  ended  up 
requiring banks to hold higher capital requirements for good loans. The regulation merely enticed 
banks to either sell the better loans or move them to their shadow banking counterparts. “Basel I...” 
as Goodhart (2010: 15) observed “...was threatening to turn „good‟ banks into „bad‟ banks”.  
 
Basel II was meant to correct this unhappy feature and did so by giving much greater importance to 
the internal risk assessment of banks. It attempted to extend regulation to assets and liabilities not on 
the  bank‟s  own  balance  sheet.  But  Basel  II‟s  capital  requirements  would  become  more 
accommodating when asset prices were rising thus fuelling a buoyant asset market. The opposite 
would happen when asset prices declined, at which point capital requirements would tighten, putting 
further downward pressure on an already fragile market (Goodhart, 2010). Put another way, under 
Basel II less capital was required when risks appeared small and more capital was needed when risks 
appeared larger. The unintended consequence of the regulation was that banks were able to expand 
their balance sheets relative to their capital base in good times and still pass regulatory scrutiny, while 
they would be required to raise more capital precisely when they were under stress and least able to 
do so.   
 
For  these  reasons  both  banks  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  became  inclined  to  hold 
insufficient  capital:  commercial  banks  held  too  little  to  cover  potential  losses  from  bad  loans; 
investment banks held too little to cover potential losses on securitised and other risky financial 
products; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held too little to cover the guarantees they had issued on   12 
MBS; and large insurance companies, such as AIG, held too little to cover guarantees they had issued 
to banks under Credit Default Swaps (Kling, 2009).  
 
In addition to the inadvertent incentives for risk taking created by financial regulation, governments 
introduced a moral hazard that strengthened this tendency. Governments and central banks have 
supported distressed financial institutions since the 19
th century to avoid the spillovers of individual 
failures from disrupting the rest of the financial sector. It was the famous second editor of  The 
Economist magazine, Walter Bagehot, who formulated the principle that a central bank should extend 
liquidity to distressed but fundamentally solvent financial firms that were experiencing difficulties 
with their short-term obligations.  
 
The underlying principle claiming that an appropriate and limited intervention by a central bank 
could prevent larger social losses by forestalling the demise of otherwise solvent financial institutions 
has since been extended to protect the financial sector from losses that would undermine the firms 
in that sector collectively. In the extended form the Bagehot principle requires central banks to 
support any financial firm regarded as systemically important, that is, a firm so large or important 
that its failure might cause the collapse of other solvent financial firms. The wave of bank defaults 
during the Great Depression, which saw the demise of thousands of banks in the US demonstrated 
the apparent worth of this principle. Central banks resolved not to make the same mistake again.   
 
In  1984  a  large  American  bank,  Continental  Illinois,  found  itself  in  financial  distress.  The  Fed 
reasoned that this was a case fitting Bagehot‟s expanded principle since Continental Illinois was 
judged to be systemically important; banks such as Continental Illinois had become „too big to fail‟, 
the title of a now famous book by Stern and Felman (2004). The subsequent bailout returned the full 
value of loans extended to Continental Illinois. To put it differently, the US government lowered 
dramatically the credit risk associated with loans to large banks such as Continental Illinois. This 
practice guided subsequent bailouts in the USA, with creditors hardly ever out of pocket even when 
the financial firms they had lent to were insolvent: for example, 99.7% of all deposits in the 1100 
commercial banks that failed in the US during the 1980s were bailed out by government (Roberts, 
2010: 10).   
 
Not everyone was bailed out though: shareholders often suffered substantial losses when the share 
price  of  a  distressed  financial  firm  crashed.  But  these  shareholders  were  still  working  in  an   13 
institutional  setting  which  had  both  the  profit  and  loss  aspects  necessary  for  effective  market 
allocation. Creditors in the financial sector were operating under a different set of rules though. 
There profit and loss had been replaced by a system of profits and bailout, undermining the need to 
manage risk through prudent screening and expensive monitoring on the part of creditors or the 
retention of substantial capital in banks to guard against unexpected losses.   
 
Not just large banks, but countries too were perceived to be „too big to fail‟. During the 1990s,   
Mexico was the most notable case of a US Government bailout, which protected lenders to the Wall 
Street creditors of the Mexican government (Roberts, 2010). This bailout and the IMF bailouts of 
East Asian governments in 1997 created the impression that creditors to large emerging market 
economies with substantial international debt would enjoy the same protection from credit risk to 
the creditors of large banks in the developed world. Many investors in Russian debt acted on this 
belief in 1998 by holding the debt of a state at the point of fiscal collapse.  
 
The decision not to bail out the Russian government in August of 1998 sent shockwaves through the 
international system and worked to encourage more bailouts. At this point the bailout principle was 
expanded to cover hedge funds, a highly risky financial institution. A prominent hedge fund, Long 
Term  Capital  Management  (LTCM),  suffered  massive  losses  during  the  crisis  and  the  Fed  was 
concerned about other hedge funds and investment banks who had large investments with LTCM. 
An insolvent LTCM would cause substantial losses for these creditors and in the heat of the crisis 
the Fed organised a private sector bailout of LTCM (Roberts, 2010). Once more, the creditors, who 
had enjoyed considerable up side from their investments in LTCM, were protected from a credit risk 
associated with their investments. 
 
While  the  bailout  mentioned  above  created  a  moral  hazard  that  made  banks  less  prudent  and 
creditors less concerned with the imprudence of the banks they were lending to, there were also 
other incentives working in the same direction. One of these, the culture of high salaries and bonuses 
on Wall Street, has been widely discussed. The other, a change in the nature of modern banks 
finance via a shadow banking system based on the securitised assets and repurchase agreements has 
received a lot less attention.  
 
The salaries and especially large bonuses tied to short-run performance led to a public outcry in the 
wake of the bailouts. While it is true that the executives lost capital as the share prices of their firms   14 
and others declined during the crisis, they did not, by any stretch of the imagination, face symmetric 
risks.  The structure  of their salaries and bonuses with rewards for short-term profits and share 
options was such that they gained enormously from good results while their downside risk was 
considerably smaller (Roberts, 2010). Given this asymmetry it is not really surprising the executives 
were keen to expand the more risky business which brought them handsome returns while the boom 
lasted.  
 
Public incentives and the role of politics 
 
Politicians played a role in the run-up to the crisis especially through their support for bailouts.  But 
their involvement in the housing market bears closer scrutiny. The account here focuses on the 
United States and concerns the specific ways in which home ownership was encouraged, creating 
incentives that ultimately fuelled the property bubble. Similar incentives were created elsewhere but 
the particular policies differed from those in the US.  
 
After many decades of encouraging home ownership through tax breaks on mortgage interest and 
the sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage associations, the US government became 
much more aggressive in its promotion of home ownership during the 1990s. To give practical effect 
to the desire for expanded home ownership in the USA politicians enacted new regulations for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 1993. The regulation not only weakened the prudential safeguards 
that prevented these companies from doing business at the risky end of the mortgage market but 
also required them to raise the proportion of loans they supported to families with incomes below 
the medium for their areas to 40% by 1996 (from 30% for Freddie and 34% for Fannie in 1993). 
This requirement was pushed up to 42% in 1999 and 55% in 2007, as both firms expanded their 
business in these market segments in step with the rising targets (Roberts, 2010: 25).  
 
At the same time Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac expanded their business in mortgages with small 
down payments of less than 5% and eventually with no down payment at all. In the mid 1990s such 
mortgages accounted for a small fraction (4% or less) of the loans they purchased but by 2007 
almost a quarter of their loans had down payments of 5% or less
6 (Roberts, 2010: Figure 8). In this 
way political pressure pushed mortgage associations to support a housing bubble that was becoming 
dangerously overheated and in a market segment where risks were poorly assessed. This is no to 
                                                 
6 Fannie and Freddie bought a quarter of 272 billion dollars worth of MBS sold in the first half of 2006 (Roberts, 2010: 
23).   15 
suggest that the housing bubble in the US and elsewhere was exclusively or even largely due to 
incentives of the kind created by politicians. It was not. The private financial sector financed the bulk 
of the credit-fuelled property bubble and it is the private financial sector that increased its gearing 
dramatically over the last 20 years, thereby amplifying the potential consequences of mistakes in their 
investment strategies. But the political incentives meant that public officials had little interest in 
scrutinising  an  industry  that  had  become  not  just  wonderfully  profitable  but  also  politically 




The housing bubble fizzled out during the course of 2007 as balance sheets in the household and 
financial sectors became ever more stretched. An important factor in this loss of momentum for the 
market was the reversal of the “great deviation” in US monetary policy, with the policy interest rate 
rising from a level of 1% in 2004 to 5.35% in 2006. Other central banks followed suit, leading to 
tighter monetary conditions internationally.  
 
The highly geared property market, where the worst quality loans were predicated on the assumption 
of an uninterrupted rise in property prices, was vulnerable even to stagnation, let alone price declines. 
When house prices started to decline by early 2007 these loans were soon and predictably under 
water, though few at the time anticipated the force of the process that started to gather pace.  
 
Large banks, including investment banks and other financial institutions, started to report sub-prime 
mortgage related losses during the first quarter of 2007. At this time the US based New Century 
Financial,  a  mortgage  lending  specialist  of  the  sub-prime  market,  filed  for  bankruptcy.  More 
disturbingly, the prominent investment bank Bear Sterns announced in June 2007 that two of its 
large hedge funds had suffered massive sub-prime related losses; it became clear that the losses 
would not be confined to one or even a few banks. Losses started to appear also in large European 
banks, such as BNP Paribas and the German Sachsen Landesbank in August 2007, and in the UK 
where in September of that year Northern Rock suffered the most serious traditional run on a British 
bank since the 19
th century.  Worse was to come.  
 
By late 2007 insurance companies providing bond insurance for Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
were also suffering massive losses. The troubled Bear Stearns finally succumbed in March 2008, 
though it was supported by the Fed until bought by the rival investment bank JP Morgan. This did   16 
not  restore  stability  as  the  housing  market  continued  to  decline,  causing  the  failure  of  another 
mortgage lender, IndyMac, in the USA by June 2007 in what was the second largest bank failure in 
US history. While the US government had to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to prevent their 
collapse, the UK government nationalised another bank, Bradford and Bingly, to prevent its collapse.  
 
The  financial  market  turmoil  deteriorated  further  during  September  2008:  Lehman  Brothers,  a 
famous Wall Street investment bank, collapsed and, critically, was not bailed-out by the authorities
7. 
Instead it was purchased by its rival Merrill Lynch, which was also heading for collapse and would be 
bought by Bank of America by the end of the year. The cri sis was no less acute in Europe. While 
Northern Rock had suffered from a traditional run on the bank a year earlier, large continental 
investment banks faced a modern bank run in the third quarter of 2008 (Blanchard, 2009). At the 
same time the Belgian gov ernment bailed out the insurance and banking giant Fortis, and large 
Icelandic banks were nearing collapse.  
 
As already mentioned, modern banks are not mainly financed by retail deposits and hence are not 
greatly exposed to the risk of a traditional bank  run. Instead they are financed on the interbank and 
repo markets on a daily basis. These highly efficient markets allow banks to co -operate to an 
unprecedented degree, as long as both parties to each transaction feel secure in the value of the 
assets traded. This trust collapsed in the third quarter of 2008, with banks unable to use their 
securities as collateral in the interbank market because other banks could no longer judge their value. 
Banks were now forced to sell other assets, such as shares, corporate bonds and so on, in an attempt 
to restore liquidity to their balance sheets and to meet the capital requirements of Basel II.  
 
The result was a fire sale in many asset markets unrelated to the housing market. Globally, stock 
market wealth was halved during the first year of the crisis, a rate of decline steeper than at the onset 
of the Great Depression (Almunia, Bénétrix, Eichengree, O‟Rourke and Rua, 2009). As asset markets 
declined the financial sector and corporate balance sheets deteriorated even further and companies 
were pushed towards bankruptcy.  
                                                 
7 From a risk perspective Lehman Brothers closely resembled Bear Sterns in early 2008: it‟s highly leveraged balance 
sheet had a similar composition to that of Bear Sterns, though Lehman‟s was many times the larger of the two. The 
failure of Bear Sterns in March 2008 therefore raised the specter of similar trouble at Lehman‟s and a declining Lehman‟s 
share price reflected these concerns (Roberts, 2010). But the subsequent bailout of Bear Sterns put these fears to bed and 
five months later it was discovered that Lehman‟s had done little to strengthen its precarious balance sheet. Only this 
time the expected bailout did not come. Credit risk, which commanded little attention after 20 years of bailouts returned 
dramatically,  for  the  creditors  (mainly  other  banks)  and  for  insurance  companies  involved  in  securitizing  the  debt 
contracts.   17 
 
By the second half of 2008 much of the developed world had declined into recession and with a 
downward trajectory that suggested disquieting comparisons with the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The economic historian Barry Eichengreen and his co-authors showed these parallels empirically, 
both for the USA and for the world economy (Almunia, Bénétrix, Eichengree, O‟Rourke and Rua, 
2009). For the sake of comparison they identified the peak of economic activity that preceded the 
Great Depression and the Great Recession for June 1929 and April 2008 respectively.  
 
While US industrial production in the recent crisis did not decline as fast as it did in 1929, at the 
global level the international economy was more fragile and the decline in industrial output was as 
steep during the first year of the Great Recession as during the comparable period of the Great 
Depression.  As production declined, unemployment rose to levels not seen in the developed world 
in many decades.  
 
Despite strong policy intervention financial conditions became much more restrictive in the private 
sectors of developed economies from this point onwards. While policy interest rate declined the 
interest rates demanded on corporate debt were pushed higher, while other credit requirements such 
as  higher  down  payments  and  increased  credit-rating  requirements  also  pushed  up  the  cost  of 
borrowing. The higher cost of credit reflects the kind of friction that emerges in financial markets 
during distress when monitoring costs and uncertainty rise sharply (Hall, 2010). More expensive 
credit and the massive shocks to aggregate demand were the main factors lowering output during the 
first months of the crisis.   
 
The world economy is extensively integrated not just financially but also in the flow of goods and 
services across boundaries. These transactions are another barometer of the extensive co-operation 
upon which modern economies are based. Each of these transactions requires a financial transaction, 
which is often a credit transaction. The turmoil on international financial markets, especially the 
tighter  credit  conditions  in  combination  with  the  collapse  of  demand  for  imported  goods  and 
services and the fact that 70% of international trade was in manufactured goods
8 (compared with 
44% in 1929) created a precipitous decline in international trade. Indeed, Almunia et al. (2009) 
showed that the contraction of international trade was notably steeper during the first year of the 
Great Contraction than at the start of the Great Depression.  
                                                 
8 Manufacturing production is a volatile component of total production and was particularly adversely affected in the 
Great Depression and the Great Recession (Almunia et al. 2009).    18 
 
Policymakers to the rescue 
 
The trauma of the Great Depression was not just the rapidity of the economic collapse but its 
persistence throughout the 1930s in countries like the USA. During the first months of the Great 
Recession, though the downward trajectory of production in the developed world resembled that of 
the Great Depression, the policy response was dramatically different. Although policy makers did 
not stand idly by during the early years of the Great Depression, there was far greater policy activism 
at the macroeconomic level in response to the Great Recession. The activism has been most evident 
in the monetary and fiscal policies pursued during the crisis and the considerable efforts to prevent 
the fragmentation of the global economy through beggar-thy-neighbour policy responses.  
 
There were undoubtedly many factors that pushed policy makers towards greater activism this time 
around, including the nature of the political system, a topic explored elsewhere in this book. But the 
two major economic factors were, first, the lessons learnt from the Great Depression, especially the 
role economists attributed to policy failures of that era and, second, the flexibility of the modern 
international financial system, which  allowed policy makers to respond more dynamically to the 
pressures that emerged in their own economies.   
 
Since the early 1990s, a durable and flexible international financial system emerged in which most 
developed and emerging market economies have become integrated with global co-operation in the 
production of goods, services and the investment of capital. By combining largely free capital flows 
with  market  determined  exchange  rates,  this  system  created  scope  for  considerable  domestic 
discretion in monetary policy, which has mainly been exercised in the direction of pursuing low and 
stable inflation and output stability. Explicit inflation targeting is the exemplar of this system, but 
many countries, including the USA, followed an implicit inflation targeting system that can hardly be 
distinguished in operational terms from explicit inflation targeting (Greenspan, 2004).  
 
At the start of the Great Depression the international financial system was ordered by the gold 
standard, a system with little scope for the kind of monetary activism seen in response to the Great 
Recession (Almunia et al, 2009). The post-War Bretton Woods system was an explicit attempt to 
design an international financial order that served both the ends of stability and policy flexibility. But   19 
it was inherently unstable and collapsed barely 13 years after the European economies joined it 
(Rose, 2006; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).   
 
The system that emerged after the collapse of Bretton Woods is unplanned and is not maintained by 
any central direction, authority, or a reference point such as gold convertibility. It is a spontaneous 
order resulting from a rules-based system of international trade and investment with flexible currency 
markets. The system proved durable and flexible (Rose, 2006) though the aftermath of the Great 
Recession has put it under unexpected pressure. Yet its flexibility created scope for policy makers to 
intervene as the extent of the crisis became obvious in the course of 2008.  
 
In  light  of  the  unnerving  parallels  with  the  early  months  of  the  Great  Depression,  monetary 
authorities were unlikely to repeat the inadvertent error of their predecessors by tightening monetary 
policy in the midst of a financial crisis; according to the standard interpretation of those unhappy 
events by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), the monetary contraction between 1929 and 1932 in the 
United States shouldered a large proportion of the blame for the depth and persistence of the Great 
Depression.  
 
The Fed and the Bank of England reduced their policy interest rate aggressively as the crisis became 
more serious in late 2008. Money supply data also testify to the accommodating stance of monetary 
authorities as the crisis deepened, with the narrow stock of money expanding briskly despite the 
financial crisis because of the introduction by central banks of large quantities of liquidity to prevent 
a repetition of the monetary contraction that exacerbated the Great Depression (Almunia et al., 
2009: Figures 9 and 10). In conventional terms then, that is, using a policy interest rate to measure 
the stance of monetary policy, monetary authorities responded quickly and sharply to the unfolding 
crisis. But there is a limit to interest policy as it is not possible to implement a negative nominal 
interest rate.  
 
Despite the prominence of interest rate policy, central banks have other policy instruments at their 
disposal. They can alter broader monetary or other asset market conditions directly by changing the 
size, composition and risk profile of their balance sheet. These policy actions are collectively called 
„balance sheet operations‟ and have been an important part of the policy response to the Great 
Recession  (Borio  and  Disyatat,  2009).  To  give  an  indication  of  the  size  of  these  balance  sheet 
operations it will suffice to say that the total assets on the Fed‟s balance sheet expanded from $880   20 
billion to $2.3 trillion between July 2007 and December 2010, including $1 trillion of Mortgage 
Backed Securities bought from the financial sector by the Fed to shore up private sector balance 
sheets. In late 2010 Fed Chairman, Ben, S. Bernanke, announced that there would be a further round 
of balance sheets questions, which has become known as Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2) and would 
amount to a further $600 billion expansion of the Fed‟s balance sheet. In addition, fiscal authorities 
responded  vigorously  to  the  crisis  with  highly  accommodating  discretionary  policies  including 
bailouts for large financial and non-financial firms, tax rebates and tax cuts for households. 
 
Have these policies been a success? It is difficult to say. For a start, the question is not whether the 
policies were successful in some ultimate sense, but whether they were better than the alternatives. 
For each country the appropriate evaluation is a comparison with the outcomes of particular forms 
of monetary and fiscal interventions with counterfactual outcomes under alternative policy regimes. 
Those counterfactuals, however, can never observed. Two additional problems contribute to the 
difficulty of evaluating the policy initiatives: First, outcomes cannot be associated on a one-to-one 
basis  with  policy  decisions  given  the  complex  and  dynamic  interactions  in  the  economy;  and, 
secondly “other”, that is non-policy, factors impact continuously on the economy with far reaching 
effects on the outcomes generated under any policy regime.  
 
As a result of such evaluation difficulties there is still no consensus on what role policy played in the 
eventual recovery from the Great Depression. In an influential paper Romer (1992) claimed that the 
reversal of monetary policy from contractionary to expansionary in the 1930s did far more to turn 
the economic corner than did fiscal policy. But behind this claim lies the observation that fiscal 
deficits were not very large during the 1930s; the historical record cannot tell us what would have 
happened had the fiscal authorities during the Great Depression adopted policies as expansionary as 
their successors did in 2009.  
 
There are two reasons for expecting policies of recent years have been more important than during 
the Great Depression. First, the power of fiscal policy rises relative to conventional monetary policy 
when the latter nears zero bound on nominal interest rates (for example IMF, 2009, but also Keynes, 
1936). Second, there is evidence that the fiscal policies of the 1930s, modest though they were, still 
had a positive impact on the recovery (Almunia et al., 2009). This time around the fiscal authorities 
have been much more active, and if the transmission mechanism had stayed approximately the same, 
the impact on output was powerfully enhanced.    21 
 
The evaluation of monetary policy is no less difficult: The rapid interest rate response by monetary 
authorities avoided the inadvertent mistakes of the 1930s and after some months the various credit 
markets returned to stability. But it is very difficult to determine whether stability returned because 
of or in spite of the extensive balance sheet operations used by central banks. A further complication 
emerged  in  the  course  of  2010,  with  the  inadvertent  but  unwelcome  impact  of  expansionary 
monetary policies especially in the USA on the exchange rates of developing countries such as Brazil 
just as these economies were starting to recover from the recession.  
 
Consequences of policy activism 
 
Policy makers around the world, as well as the IMF, supported the active monetary and fiscal policy 
interventions of 2008 and 2009 and committed themselves to maintain an open and integrated global 
economy. They were going to avoid the beggar-they-neighbour policies that featured so prominently 
and cost the world so dearly in the 1930s. On the whole they succeeded. There were only sporadic 
protectionist responses to the crisis and international co-operation was sustained.  
 
But in the course of 2010 the spillover effects in developing countries of the policies pursued by 
developed  countries  cast  a  shadow  over  continued  international  co-operation.  The  Fed‟s  move 
towards a further large round of quantitative easing in September and October 2010 pushed the issue 
to breaking point. “We‟re in the midst of an international currency war, a general weakening of 
currency...” claimed an alarmed Guido Mantega, the Brazilian Finance Minister in September 2010. 
This war, he continued “threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness”. The problem, 
according to Minister Mantega, was the influence of US monetary policy on the international value 
of the dollar, which implied appreciating currencies for developing countries like Brazil and South 
Africa.  According  to  Minister  Mantega  the  US  monetary  policy  had,  in  effect,  become  another 
example of the beggar-they-neighbour policies by which a government tries to gain an economic 
advantage by manipulating the international price of goods and services.  
 
Minister Mantega is not right. The depreciation of the dollar has not been the intention of the US 
monetary authorities, nor it is not inappropriate given the imbalances in trade and capital flows 
internationally. A substantial depreciation of the dollar had long been expected because of the said 
imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2005). But Minister Mantega was not wrong to argue that beggar-  22 
they-neighbour policies have been disrupting the global economy; it is the Chinese government that 
has manipulated currency market outcomes in its favour on an unprecedented scale over the last 
decade Wolf (2010a).   
 
The accumulation of approximately $2.5 trillion in foreign currency reserves, a third of all such 
reserves internationally and equal to half the annual size of the Chinese economy, is a major evidence 
of currency manipulation. It is the combination of reserve accumulation with tight controls on the 
inflow of capital into China that creates the scope for this kind of market distortion. By preventing a 
rise  in  domestic  demand  and  a  real  appreciation  of  the  Chinese  currency,  its  government  is 
subsidising Chinese exports internationally. Since the Chinese economy is now the largest exporter in 
the world this kind of distortion matters (Wolf, 2010b).  
 
While the Chinese government had, in the past, denied that its currency was undervalued, it has lately 
offered a different explanation: a rapid appreciation of the Chinese currency would undermine the 
profitability of Chinese exporters and risk social unrest which would, in the words of Premier Wen 
Jiabao “...be a disaster for the world” (Beattie, Chaffin and Brown, 2010). This argument is not very 
persuasive outside China; it merely suggests that Chinese export firms might be competitive only on 
account of the undervalued currency.  
 
While international trade has the potential to leave all parties better off, that will only happen if the 
goods and services are produced internationally where there is comparative (cost) advantage to do 
so. The rules-based system for international trade, maintained by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), has been designed to ensure open international co-operation that is beneficial for all parties 
concerned. The asymmetric manner in which the Chinese economy has entered this system over the 
last decade, exporting capital on an unprecedented scale while restricting capital inflows to China and 
maintaining  an  undervalued  Chinese  currency,  has  put  tremendous  strain  on  international  co-
operation.  
 
The strain became visible with the retreat from co-operation by countries such as Brazil, Russia, 
Thailand and others as they re-imposed various capital controls. Consequently the currency war was 
high on the agenda when the G20 heads of state met in South Korea in November 2010. In Seoul 
the American delegation proposed a three-point plan to untangle the currency wars by, first, putting 
numerical limits on current account imbalances with policy commitments to keep them effective;   23 
second,  a  stronger  role  for  the  IMF  to  monitor  behaviour  relative  to  these  limits;  and,  third, 
sufficient  exchange  rate  flexibility  and  openness  to  ensure  an  orderly  rebalancing  of  the  world 
economy. These suggestions  along with that of World Bank chief Robert Zoellick (2010) who 
recommended  the  return  to  a  form  of  a  gold  standard,  are  meant  to    reduce  the  tensions  in 
international economic co-operation by designing a new more co-operative international order. But 
the inflexibility of the former gold standard and the instability of the Bretton Woods system suggest 
that these are not promising ideas. Nor did the G20 heads of state find them attractive in Seoul, 
preferring the much watered down “indicative guidelines” on international balances. At the time of 
writing,  the  pressures  created  by  the  policy  responses  during  the  Great  Recession  remained  a 
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